Motivated by calls for increased compliance, size-based regulation, and continued exemption of small firms from internal control reporting requirements, we assess the incremental effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news on disclosure compliance. We examine compliance with the disclosure requirements of an SEC-mandated filing that requires no computations or complex judgments, but is non-routine and may reveal value-decreasing information (i.e., bad news) that otherwise would not become public. The disclosures studied are those that firms provide in Form 8-K Item 4 when changing external auditors. We find that non-compliant firms have lower quality corporate governance and less need for external financing, but are not smaller than compliant control firms. Additional analyses indicate that compliance is negatively associated with bad news. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=955922
To provide evidence on factors that affect disclosure compliance, we examine compliance with a straight-forward disclosure requirement: to report the circumstances of an auditor change. The setting provides a base case that does not require knowledge of any commercial arrangement, estimation of an amount, or judgment of materiality. All that is required is that management states the facts concerning the (infrequent) occurrence of an auditor change. The disclosures are considered relevant to investors because an auditor change raises questions about the reliability of financial statement information (Knapp and Elikai 1988) .
In two analyses of compliance with SEC auditor change filing requirements, Soo (1995, 1996) focus on compliance with timely filing requirements (i.e., do firms file within the allowed time period), not on compliance with requirements that specify the content of auditor change filings. At the time of their studies, disclosures about the reasons for auditor change were voluntary. Schwartz and Soo's results indicate that late filing of Form 8-K Item 4 ("8-K Item 4") is negatively associated with firm size and positively associated with corporate financial distress. We find that size and financial condition have no incremental explanatory power in our study of compliance with 8-K Item 4 disclosure content requirements, and there is an association between corporate governance quality and disclosure compliance. SEC Regulation S-K, Item 304(a) requires that firms report the termination of association with an external auditor in 8-K Item 4, including information on client and auditor circumstances surrounding the termination. Unlike some required disclosures, information about auditor changes omitted from 8-K Item 4 filings will not necessarily become publicly available through alternative sources. Evidence of the importance of 8-K Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
Item 4 filings and the negative market reaction to bad news disclosed in them (e.g., DeFond et al. 1997; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Wells and Louder 1997; Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2004) provides an alternative (to size) explanation for firm failures in disclosure compliance: suppression of bad news.
We focus our initial analysis on firms' auditor change disclosures at 128 firms that convey bad news. We compare firm size and the quality of corporate governance for firms that disclosed (versus failed to disclose) bad news about the circumstances of auditor changes. We identify firms' failures to disclose bad news using SEC staff comment letters filed between May 2005 and April 2007. 2 We match firms that failed to comply with disclosure requirements with firms that have the same types of bad news but that complied with disclosure requirements. Our results indicate that, for this sample, firms that failed to properly disclose bad news had weaker corporate governance and relied less on external financing than those that properly disclosed bad news. Firm size is not a significant determinant of bad news disclosure.
We test the sensitivity of these results by comparing all firms identified from SEC comment letters as failing to provide all required auditor change disclosures with a sample of fully disclosing firms (N = 161) matched by date of auditor change. The comparison includes proxies for firm size, corporate governance, bad news, and control variables. Results show that firms that failed to properly disclose bad news have weaker corporate governance, are less likely to have a departing Big 4 auditor, are more likely to 2 SEC Comment letters were first posted to the SEC EDGAR website on May 12, 2005 . The majority of the originally posted letters relate to 8-K Item 4 omissions. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
have certain types of bad news (lack of board approval for the auditor change and clientauditor disagreements), and are similar in size to firms that properly disclosed bad news.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our results do not support the contention that firm size per se reduces compliance with straight-forward disclosure obligations. Our results suggest that firm compliance is positively associated with the quality of corporate governance, and negatively associated with the disclosure of certain types of bad news. The positive relation between compliance and corporate governance demonstrates the importance of strong corporate governance even in small firms. This importance is further supported by our results showing that small firms with high quality corporate governance are more likely to disclose bad news. These results suggest that governance improvements at small firms would improve compliance with disclosure requirements even in the presence of bad news.
Second, we provide evidence on compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (Schwartz and Soo 1995; Ettredge et al. 2001 ) using SEC staff objections to firm disclosures in comment letters posted on the SEC website. A number of studies develop and test explanations for discretionary disclosures (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Graham et al. 2005) , and with SEC filing deadline compliance (e.g., Schwartz and Soo 1996; Ettredge et al. 2006) . 3 Studies of why managers fail to comply with seemingly straight-forward disclosure requirements likely are missing because of the lack of information about disclosure violations prior to the public release of SEC comment letters 3 Other studies have investigated tax compliance (e.g., Slemrod 1992; Andreoni et al. 1998; Davis et al. 2003; and Martinez-Vasques and Rider 2005) . These studies consider the tax decisions of individuals, not corporations. Hammersley et al. (2010) examine firms that fail to comply with requirements to remediate previously identified internal control deficiencies. They are more concerned with documenting the consequences of noncompliance than the reasons for noncompliance. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The next section of the paper describes the SEC staff comment letter database and 8-K Item 4 disclosure requirements. Section 3 presents our theory, conceptual constructs, and expected associations. Section 4 discusses the sample, models and variables. Sections 5 and 6 report the results. Section 7 discusses limitations, summarizes, and concludes.
The SEC comment letter database and Form 8-K Item 4
We identify firms that failed to comply with 8-K Item 4 disclosure requirements using SEC staff comment letters that assert that submitted filings do not contain all required disclosure items. SEC staff comment letters form one foundation for the SEC's enforcement process by providing incentives for managers and auditors to avoid both Ettredge, Michael. (2011) A 2007 interview with an SEC staff member provided the following information about the comment letter process. The staff undertakes several types of reviews: full review, financial statement review (including footnotes), and targeted (limited scope) reviews. The subjects of targeted reviews change over time. The criteria for selection of filings for review are not made public because doing so might prompt firms to take steps to avoid review. The SEC neither confirms nor denies that the SEC staff reviews all 8-K Item 4s that are filed. However, we examine 225 8-K Item 4s submitted by control firms that did not receive SEC staff comment letters. (See discussions of control samples in Sections 4.1 and 6.2) All contained the required disclosures. We are confident that the SEC review process does not result in failure to challenge significant numbers of 8-K Item 4s that lack required disclosures. 5 A May 2007 interview with an SEC staff member indicated that if a registrant does not respond to a comment letter, a staff member follows up with a phone call. Historically, non-response has not been a problem. Referral to the enforcement division is not common because registrants usually acquiesce to the SEC's suggestions. 6 Audit Analytics now provides a database of SEC comment letters. 7 A May 2007 interview with an SEC staff member confirmed that the SEC intentionally posted letters dealing with auditor change disclosures first, as a trial effort. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) 
Firm Size
The SEC has expressed concern that smaller registrants lack sufficient qualified personnel to deal with disclosure requirements. We expect firm size to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance.
Corporate governance quality 8 The primary method for initially identifying non-compliance is firm receipt of an SEC staff comment letter. We scrutinize 8-K Item 4s of all non-compliant firms to determine the nature of the information omitted. We study the 8-K Item 4s of all matching, compliant firms to ensure that all information items are present. 9 The SEC currently designates firms with less than $75 million public float as smaller registrants. The previous threshold was less than $25 million in public common equity and less than $25 million in annual revenue. The change in threshold is expected to increase the number of smaller reporting firms to 4,976 from 3,395, an increase of 47%. Firms without calculable public float are considered small reporting firms if the previous year's revenues were less than $50 million. 10 Non-accelerated filers are still required to perform their own assessments of internal control and those assessments are now subject to liability under securities laws. However, non-accelerated filers need not provide an external auditor's Section 404 internal control assessment (KPMG 2010). Ettredge, Michael. (2011) Corporate governance is an important determinant of disclosure compliance. The
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2004) notes that the board of directors is responsible for monitoring firm risk control activities, including reporting efforts. 11 The audit committee also has a direct role in external reporting. Karamanou and Vafaes (2005, 453) state that "empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that effective corporate governance is associated with higher financial disclosure policy." Research has established a positive relation between board independence and practices consistent with high quality corporate governance (Weisenbach 1988 , Brickely et al. 1994 , and between financial expertise and other audit committee characteristics and the effectiveness of monitoring financial reporting (Menon and Williams 1994; Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello and Neal 2003; Bedard et al. 2004 ). We use measures of board quality and audit committee quality as proxies for governance quality. We expect higher quality board and audit committee governance to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance.
Both Congressional mandate and prevailing business practice hold CFOs accountable for the quality of financial information issued by their corporations (Geiger and North 2006) . Research links CFO quality and internal control quality (Li et al. 2010) .
Because the CFO typically is responsible for initiating non-routine filings (e.g., Forms 8-K) as well as routine filings (e.g. Forms 10-K and 10-Q), we expect CFOs with more experience to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance.
12 11 The enterprise risk management process, as defined by COSO, is designed to achieve (among other objectives) "the reliability of the entity's reporting including both internal and external reporting of financial and non-financial information" (2004, 124) .
12 COSO (2004, 87) states that the CFO "influences the design, implementation, and monitoring of the firm's reporting systems." According to Deloitte & Touche's CFO Management Framework (D&T 2006) , the CFO's finance department should "prepare accurate, validated reporting to meet statutory, SEC, and shareholder needs in a timely fashion." Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
Size of external auditor
The identity of the departing external auditor also can affect disclosure compliance.
There is substantial evidence that audits by larger (Big 4) firms are of higher quality (see Francis 2004 for a review). The largest accounting firms should have greater knowledge of disclosure and filing requirements regarding auditor changes, and we expect these audit firms to share such knowledge with their clients (Ettredge et al. 2001 ). Thus, we expect the existence of a departing Big 4 auditor (compared to a departing non-Big 4 auditor) to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance.
Bad news in 8-K Item 4
auditor with a copy of the disclosures it intended to make in 8-K Item 4. Items (6) and (7) occur very infrequently (bad news omission of such events occurs less than one percent of the time), so we do not code these disclosures as bad news.
Previous research analyzes market responses to auditor change disclosures. For example, Schwartz and Soo's (1995) indicating problems with financial statement reliability are also associated with negative stock price reactions, while those related only to internal control events are not (Whisenant et al. 2003) . Smith (1988) provides additional evidence of negative market reaction to auditor change bad news. Managers with knowledge of adverse circumstances associated with auditor changes have disincentives to disclose that information. We therefore expect bad news to be negatively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance. If failure to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in 8-K Item 4 is due to innocuous mistakes, rather than opportunistic omissions, the information omitted from 8-K Item 4s should be random rather than disproportionately adverse.
13
13 A 2006 SEC study of restatements of financial reports found that the majority of errors restated arise from mistakes. The Deputy Chief Accountant of the SEC stated, "Internal-control structures are missing things, corporate-finance staffs are missing things and auditors are missing things" (Reilly 2006) . If these factors also are causing 8-K Item 4 errors, our corporate governance quality variables should be positively Ettredge, Michael. (2011) properly disclosed the bad news and therefore did not receive a comment letter from the SEC. 
We present definitions and data sources in Table 2 . The dependent variable, FULDISC, equals one for control firms that disclosed all required items in the auditor-change 8-K Item 4 and equals zero for test firms that received SEC comment letters. SIZE proxies for firm size. GOV1 through GOVj are proxies for corporate governance quality. We also estimate a second model in which we replace all governance proxies with a summary governance index, GOV. Both models also include the size of the departing auditor (Big 4 or other), plus control variables.
[Insert will be negatively associated with disclosure compliance.
Our proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity,
LNMV.
As a robustness check we use a dichotomous variable, LARGE, which equals one for firms with market value of equity greater than $75 million and zero otherwise. We employ this dichotomous variable because the SEC views $75 million as a meaningful 16 Under Item 304 of Regulation S-K, reportable events include: (1) the auditor advised the client that internal controls are inadequate, (2) the auditor is unwilling to rely on management's representations, or to be associated with the financial statements, (3) the auditor advised the client of the need to expand the scope of the audit, and/or (4) the auditor advised the client that information has come to light that materially affects the fairness or reliability of a prior audit report or of the current financial statements. regulatory break-point in public firm size. We expect that size is positively associated with disclosure compliance.
Our proxies for corporate governance quality fall into three categories: (1) board of directors, (2) audit committee, and (3) chief financial officer (CFO). BODINDPCT is the number of independent board of directors divided by the total number of board members. 17 BODMEET is the number of board meetings annually. We expect both of these variables to be positively associated with disclosure compliance. CEOCHAIR equals one if the client's CEO also serves as chairman of the board, and zero otherwise.
We expect this variable to be negatively associated with disclosure compliance.
18
Regarding audit committee characteristics, AUDCOM equals one if the firm has an audit committee, and equals zero otherwise. 19 ACMEET equals the number of audit committee meetings held annually. FINEXPRT is equal to the number of financial experts on the audit committee, as defined by the SEC and as designated by the firm. We expect each of these variables to be positively associated with disclosure compliance.
Regarding CFO characteristics, we measure CFO experience as the number of years the CFO has held that position, CFOTENURE, and expect greater experience to be positively associated with disclosure compliance. CFOBOD is equal to one if the CFO is on the board and to zero otherwise. We anticipate that CFOBOD will be negatively associated with disclosure compliance because the CFO's presence may make the board less independent of management with regard to reporting and disclosure. Finally, given 17 We determine director independence based on firm classifications provided in proxy statements. 18 This expectation is consistent with the negative association between CEO duality and the high quality governance practice of managerial turnover following restatements (Desai et al. 2006) . 19 We code audit committee existence rather than percentage of independent audit committee members because our sample includes firms with shares quoted on the OTCBB and Pink Sheets, which are not subject to exchange listing requirements and have not voluntarily created audit committees. 20 We expect that the presence of an internal control material weakness will be negatively associated with disclosure compliance.
We use GOV as a summary measure in an alternative version of model (1). GOV is derived from the nine governance indicator variables. We add one to the value of GOV if the value of BODINDPCT, BODMEET, ACMEET, FINEXPRT or CFOTENURE is larger than the sample median, respectively. We add one to the value of GOV if CEOCHAIR equals zero, if CFOBOD equals zero, if AUDCOM equals one, and if INTCONMW equals zero, respectively. We expect that higher quality corporate governance as indicated by GOV will be positively associated with disclosure compliance.
We measure the effect of the external audit firm using BIG4DEPART, which equals one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm prior to the auditor change, and zero otherwise. We expect that departing Big 4 auditors are more likely than other audit firms to remind their clients to make complete 8-K Item 4 filings, and are more likely to ensure that the clients follow through. Thus, BIG4DEPART should be positively associated with disclosure compliance.
Control variables
We use two control variables to capture managers' incentives and ability to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. The first captures firm plans to raise 20 For smaller firms not subject to SOX Section 404, we use internal control information reported under SOX Section 302. Because firms subject to greater scrutiny by investors and regulators have more incentives to invest in governance infrastructure, and greater incentives to comply, we expect a positive association between external financing and disclosure compliance. The second control variable measures firms' financial health. Financially distressed firms likely have less ability to comply with disclosure requirements because they devote their scarce monetary resources and managerial attention to restoring profitability. In fact, those approaching bankruptcy experience more reporting problems (Schwartz and Soo 1995) . We proxy for financial health based on ranked Altman's Z scores. Those in the lowest decile of Z scores (i.e., having the highest bankruptcy risk) are assigned 10 for BKRPTRANK. Clients in the next highest decile are assigned 9, and so on down to the highest Z score decile, coded 1. We expect BKRPTRANK to be negatively associated with disclosure compliance. The two groups are similar in terms of percent of independent board members,
Results for firms matched on bad news
BODINDPCT, in terms of internal control material weakness, INTCONMW, and in the control variables, EXTFIN and BKRPTRANK.
[Insert Table 3 about Here] suggesting that size is a noisy corporate governance quality proxy.
[Insert Table 4 about Here] [Insert Table 5 about Here] Size becomes significant and negative when LNMV is replaced with LARGE (not tabulated). Further, disclosure compliance is positively associated with higher quality corporate governance (GOV, p = 0.001); the summary measure yields the same inferences as individual components. In summary, given bad news auditor change circumstances, the disclosure of that bad news in 8-K Item 4 filings is more likely for firms with higher quality corporate governance and reliance on external financing. Size is not associated with disclosure compliance in the presence of variables that capture corporate governance quality.
Additional Analyses

Within-test-sample evidence on omission of bad news
The results of within-sample tests of association (χ 2 ) between specific types of bad news and their disclosure are mixed. 21 Firms disproportionately fail to disclose some types of 21 Tabled results of within sample tests will be provided upon request. 22 This sample includes the 64 analyzed in section 5, plus an additional 97 that omitted required items from 8-K Item 4s, but whose omitted information did not constitute bad news. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) [Insert Table 6 about Here]
Columns (a) and (b) of Table 6 also less likely to have departing Big 4 auditors (p = 0.000), and more likely to have bad news circumstances: auditor resignation (p = 0.000), lack of board approval of the auditor change (p = 0.000), more disagreement (p = 0.058), and prior going concern opinions (0.000). Test firms are in better financial condition than control firms. Table 7 reports results for two models estimated with the 322 test and control firms described in Table 6 . The first model includes all individual variables measuring corporate governance quality and bad news (the "component variables model"), and the second includes summary corporate governance and bad news variables (the "summary variables model").
The results concerning firm size and corporate governance quality for these two models are consistent with the results in Table 5 in the summary variables model. The results of these supplemental analyses using an Ettredge, Michael. (2011) alternative sample and matching procedure yield the same inferences as our analysis of firms matched on bad news.
[Insert Table 7 about Here]
Limitations, summary, and conclusions
This study assesses the incremental effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news on disclosure compliance on 8-K Item 4 filings. It is motivated by recent regulatory changes and calls for size-based disclosure regulation suggesting that firm size is an important determinant of ability to comply with accounting and disclosure requirements. To provide evidence on the factors that affect disclosure compliance, we investigate compliance with the straight-forward requirement that SEC registrants disclose information about the circumstances surrounding an auditor change. The disclosures require no computations or complex judgments but are non-routine and may require disclosure of information that previous research indicates is viewed as valuedecreasing. Our inferences regarding the lack of explanatory power of size in the presence of variables capturing corporate governance quality may not necessarily apply to other disclosure settings that do not have this characteristic. Future research could study whether size represents ability to comply in other more complex mandatory disclosure contexts.
Non-compliance related to firm size and corporate governance quality in the absence of bad news could occur because small firms lack some combination of qualified personnel and internal controls needed to ensure compliance. Although not complex, the auditor change disclosure requirements could be viewed as challenging for small firms if Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
their personnel are not familiar with reporting requirements for infrequent events, particularly if they are served by small audit firms less familiar with non-routine SEC filing requirements.
We model compliance with auditor change disclosure requirements as a function of firm size, corporate governance quality, and whether the disclosure includes bad news that might not otherwise become public. We compare test firms that did not comply with the SEC's disclosure requirements in their 8-K Item 4 filings to several samples of control firms. We collect information about compliance from SEC staff comment letters first made public in 2005.
Our main results and sensitivity tests indicate that firm size is not a significant determinant of compliance with auditor change disclosure requirements in the presence of variables that capture corporate governance quality. We believe these findings call into question the advisability of using firm size as the sole criterion for the imposition of or exemption from firm disclosure requirements. While an arbitrary size-cutoff provides registrants with a rule for determining applicable disclosure requirements, our results suggest that other firm characteristics would better distinguish firms that are likely to violate disclosure requirements.
Specifically, our results highlight the association between corporate governance and disclosure compliance. We find that features of the board of directors, the audit committee, and CFOs, and the strength of internal controls all are significantly associated with disclosure compliance. We find that more active boards and audit committees that meet frequently encourage disclosure compliance. We also find a positive association between disclosure compliance and both the number of financial experts on the audit Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
committee and the tenure of the CFO. Thus, our results highlight the role of financial expertise and experience in assuring disclosure compliance. Finally, our results provide evidence consistent with opportunistic non-compliance in that we find that omissions of bad news are more common than omissions of good news or neutral news, particularly in situations involving failure to obtain board approval of auditor changes and disagreements with the prior audit firm. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
EXTFIN
= the sum of equity financing and debt financing, scaled by total assets. Equity financing equals sales of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock and cash dividends; debt financing equals long-term debt issued minus long-term debt reduction minus change in current debt. It is measured in the fiscal year after the auditor change.
Compustat BKRPTRANK = the decile rank of the client's Altman's Z score. Clients in the decile having the highest bankruptcy risk are assigned a value of '10' and so on down to '1' for the lowest risk decile.
Compustat ___________________________________________________________________________ Ettredge, Michael. (2011) ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. All p-values are one-tailed for coefficients having the expected signs, and are two-tailed otherwise. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. P-values are two-tailed. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>. Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. Table 2 for variable definitions. The components variable model employs all available proxies for quality of governance and bad news as explanatory variables. The summary variables model replaces the bad news and governance proxies with summary variables BAD and GOV. Models are estimated using a sample of 161 test firms that failed to disclose required information in 8-K Item 4s, and 161 matching control firms that changed auditors on approximately the same dates, but disclosed all required items. Data in the table represent the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values of Wald Chi-squares. All p-values are onetailed for coefficients having the expected signs, and are two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.
